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THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
Patricia M. Wald* 
1. BACKGROUND AND PLAYERS 
In the United States the framework for environmental protection 
is primarily a statutory one. In the past two decades, Congress has 
passed laws requiring that all federal agencies take account of the 
environmental consequences of their decisions and mandating that 
the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) act to 
improve the quality of our air and water, control the disposal of our 
wastes, and preserve our natural resources from exploitation. 1 Con-
gress often has gone into great detail in these laws on its goals and 
the means and the time frames for their accomplishment. For ex-
ample, the Clean Air Act2 (CAA) established a joint federal-state 
program to set standards for air quality and develop effective en-
forcement mechanisms to attain those standards; similarly, the Clean 
• Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. B.A., 
Connecticut College for Women, 1948; LL.B., Yale University, 1951. I am indebted to Pro-
fessor William H. Rodgers, Jr. and his three-volume work on environmental law for innu-
merable references and ideas in this paper. I also would like to thank Kimberly Leue, J.D., 
Stanford Law School, 1990, my law clerk from 1990 to 1991, for her research assistance. 
1 These federal laws include the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
(FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988); Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 2601-2671 (1988); Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1988); Wild and Scenic Rivers 
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1988); Marine Mammals Protection Act (MMPA), 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 1361-1407 (1988); Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1988); 
Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988); Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988); National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-
4370c (1988); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k 
(1988); Clean Air Act (CAA) , 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (1988) (amended 1990); and the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 9601-9675 (1988). 
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (1988). 
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Water Act3 (CWA) relies on federal and state programs to set ef-
fluent limits and water quality standards and embodies an enforce-
ment mechanism at both the federal and state level to attain those 
standards. 
Congress has recognized both the rapidly changing state of our 
knowledge about environmental dangers4 and its own short attention 
span and inevitably political orientation in dealing with anyone 
subject, even the environment. As a result, it has delegated author-
ity and discretion under those laws to the executive, and primarily 
to the EPA, to create and operate the apparatus for carrying out 
the laws' goals. For instance, over the past twenty years Congress 
has revisited the CAA for major overhauls only twice, in 1977 and 
in 1990. In the interim, it has relied on the EPA and the courts to 
keep the United States's environmental protection programs on 
track. 
There is no question that, over the years, Congress has followed 
major court decisions closely in making amendments to federal en-
vironmentallaws. Litigation serves to point out the ambiguities and 
counterproductive provisions in a particular law, the gaps and loop-
holes in its regulatory scheme, or the unanticipated effects of one 
of its provisions. The reports of Congress on its amendments to 
these environmental laws are peppered with citations to court de-
cisions that the legislators wish either to affirm or to overrule. 
Moreover, judges often pointedly suggest in their opinions that Con-
gress specifically address a problem an existing law raises. 5 
How do the courts enter the picture? In each of its environmental 
laws Congress has specified-with varying degrees of clarity-which 
actions of the EPA or other agencies a party can challenge in court 
and what the challenger must prove. Because Congress often has 
been at odds with the executive branch over the implementation of 
environmental legislation, the provisions for court review of the 
EPA's actions are unusually detailed. In many statutes, Congress 
has included provisions regarding judicial review to preempt the less 
specific Administrative Procedure Act (APA) review provisions that 
typically govern challenges to regulatory statutes. 
3 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988). 
4 See, e.g., Doctor Now Doubts Dioxin Danger, WASH. TIMES, May 27, 1991, at A2 (federal 
health official who recommended in 1982 that town be evacuated because of contamination by 
dioxin no longer views it as danger). 
6 For example, Justice Powell suggested in his dissent in Tennessee Valley Authority v. 
Hill that Congress might need to amend the ESA to avoid the result in that case: an injunction 
against the construction of a dam, to ensure the snail darter's habitat. See 437 U.S. 153, 210 
(1978) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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In general, the prominent place accorded judicial review in federal 
environmental statutes must be viewed in the context of our overall 
concepts of limited government and the separation of powers. There 
must be a neutral forum in which to decide disputes over whether 
the executive branch is carrying out the will of Congress as set out 
in the laws, whether it is exercising authority it was never given, 
whether it is declining to follow mandates it was given, and whether 
it is making unreasonable decisions when it has rulemaking discre-
tion. When Congress originally passed the major environmental laws 
in the early 1970s, there was widespread suspicion among its mem-
bers that the executive branch would not move fast enough on its 
own-that it had become a "captive" of private industry. Again in 
the mid-1980s there was profound disenchantment with the way the 
EPA was doing (or not doing) its business. Congress therefore gave 
the courts the important role of watchdog in order to insure fidelity 
to the laws' strictures. The fact that, during much of the past two 
decades, the presidency and Congress have been in the hands of 
different political parties has intensified the constitutionally embed-
ded tensions between the branches. 
In addition to the several environmental players within the federal 
government, state agencies and state courts are major participants 
in the implementation of environmental laws. Until 1970 Congress 
and the states considered environmental protection to be primarily 
a local concern. Decentralized environmental decisionmaking was 
thought to conform best to principles of federalism because it allowed 
value-laden policy choices to occur at the level of government closest 
to the region and the citizens that these decisions would affect. 6 
Warring political factions within and among states, competition be-
tween states for natural resources, and pollution that cut across 
state lines, however, ultimately led to widespread recognition of the 
need for an overarching national policy of environmental protection. 7 
In response to that need, Congress passed many federal environ-
mental laws that simultaneously embody national goals and rely on 
states to implement federal guidelines through the exercise of state 
police powers.8 At first blush, imposing national rules might seem 
at odds with the traditional principles of federalism. The cooperation 
that these dual enforcement schemes envisioned between the federal 
6 See Steven L. Humphreys, Note, An Enemy of the People: Prosecuting the Corporate 
Polluter as a Common Criminal, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 311, 330 (1990). 
7 See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating 
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1211-16 (1977). 
8 See Robert E. Manley, Federalism and Management of the Environment, 19 URB. LAW. 
661, 664-66 (1987). 
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government and the states, however, was designed to encourage 
more political responsibility and more awareness of each govern-
ment's concerns by the other and to avoid the parochialism that 
would occur if each government dealt only with what was in its own 
back yard. 9 
The 1970 CAA was the first of many so-called "cooperative fed-
eralism" statutes. It changed the federal-state relationship into one 
in which the states became the prime enforcers of the statute but 
the federal government assumed the authority to exercise vigilant 
oversight and intervene if state enforcement was inadequate. 10 Orig-
inally, Congress intended cooperative federalism to both diffuse the 
possibility of duplicate efforts by federal and state agencies and solve 
the dilemma of finite resources at both the federal and state level 
by allocating responsibilities. Unfortunately, however, state agen-
cies have received greater responsibility to enforce federal laws but 
have not always secured the necessary funding to accomplish this 
task. 11 
Close coordination among the federal and state governments and 
proper allocation of responsibilities among federal and state agencies 
are important aspects of cooperative federalism. For example, there 
are both federal and state statutes that govern cleanup and disposal 
of hazardous wastes; the question of who will be responsible for a 
cleanup can be a major impediment to getting the job done. Another 
example is the CW A which provides for two tiers of water quality 
rules: state and federal. A state must establish water quality stan-
dards and set up a permit program that at least embodies the na-
tional water effluent limitations, and must enforce both the state 
standards and the national standards. The state may enact water 
quality standards that are stricter than the national effluent limita-
tions, so long as these standards do not conflict with the federal 
law. 12 Although in some cases the EPA has delegated authority to 
9 See Robert L. Glicksman, Federal Preemption and Private Legal Remedies for Pollution, 
134 U. PA. L. REV. 121, 134 (1985). 
10 See Randall S. Schipper, Note, Administrative Preclusion of Environmental Citizen 
Suits, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 163, 163-64. 
II See David Schnapf, State Hazardous Waste Program Under the Federal Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act, 12 ENVTL. L. 679, 682 (1982); B. Drummond Ayers Jr., New 
Federalism Gets Down to Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1981, § 4, at 4; see also Karen L. 
FIorini, Issues of Federalism in Hazardous Waste Control: Cooperation or Confusion?, 6 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 307, 323 (1982) (noting that "in order to bring sites up to applicable 
environmental regulations, states may be forced to spend their own money to continue work 
at sites at which cleanup began under Superfund"). 
12 See 33 U.S.C. § 1316(c) (1988). 
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implement the national effluent limitations to the states, if a state 
elects not to enforce the national standards through its own water 
quality permit program, the EPA will step in and enforce both the 
state and national standards. 13 Thus, some critics have suggested 
that, although the CWA conforms to federalist principles at a sym-
bolic level, the Act represents "a classic case of federal takeover, 
stemming from Congress's dissatisfaction with cleanup efforts by the 
States. "14 
Courts play an important role in clarifying the uncertainties that 
cooperative federalism creates. Courts often must determine which 
statute, federal or state, applies when there is a conflict and simul-
taneous enforcement of both laws is impossible. 15 For example, the 
cost of cleaning up a hazardous waste landfill can be recovered only 
once--either under a state superfund law or the federal superfund 
statute, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act (CERCLA). In addition to determining 
whether federal or state law or both govern in a particular situation, 
courts may also have to decide which agency-federal or state-has 
the authority to enforce the particular laws. 16 
The question of whether states can hold federal agencies liable for 
violating state environmental laws also often faces courtS. 17 In one 
case, a state agency was allowed to enforce its own laws regarding 
the treatment and disposal of hazardous waste against a federal 
facility.18 The United States Supreme Court held in another case 
that the CAA obligates federal installations discharging air pollu-
tants to comply with state regulations, although the installations 
need not obtain state permits. 19 Indeed, the Supreme Court recently 
13 See generally id. § 1319. 
14 HARVEY LIEBER & BRUCE ROSINOFF, FEDERALISM AND CLEAN WATERS: THE 1972 
WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT, preface (1975), quoted in 2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER § 4.2, at 21 (1986). 
15 See Ferebee v. Chevron Chern. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1542 (D.C. Cir.) (jury could find 
pesticide manufacturer's label sufficiently defective under state law to warrant liability to 
third party, even though manufacturer complied with EPA labelling standards), em. denied, 
469 U.S. 1062 (1984). 
16 See, e.g., United States v. Puerto Rico, 721 F.2d 832, 839-40 (1st Cir. 1983); Colorado 
v. United States Dep't of Army, 707 F. Supp. 1562, 1564 (D. Colo. 1989). 
17 See, e.g., EPA v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 201 (1975) 
(superseded by 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (1990) (CAA) as noted in United States v. Air Pollution 
Control Bd. of Tenn., 31 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1492, 1497, 1501 (M.D. Tenn. 1990». 
18 See Colorado v. United States Dep't of Army, 707 F. Supp. 1562, 1572 (D. Colo. 1989). 
19 See Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 198-99 (1976) (superseded by 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) 
(1990) (CAA) as noted in United States v. Air Pollution Control Bd. of Tenn., 31 Env't Rep. 
Cas. (BNA) 1492, 1501 (M.D. Tenn. 1990». 
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agreed to hear a case to determine whether the United States has 
sovereign immunity, respectively, from civil penalties under the 
CWA for violation of state water pollution control laws,20 and from 
federal civil penalties under the Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act (RCRA).21 On the other hand, parties may call upon courts 
to determine whether and when the federal government, under cer-
tain statutes, has authority to enforce both federal and state laws 
against a state. For example, under the CWA, the EPA has asserted 
the authority to enforce both the state and federal water quality 
standards against any violator including the state government.22 
It is not always clear which court, federal or state, will have 
jurisdiction over a particular case. For the most part, federal courts 
will hear a case if there is a federal interest at stake, such as the 
enforcement of national environmental standards.23 There always has 
been an understandable concern that too great an exercise of federal 
jurisdiction will undermine the ends of federalism, such as the en-
couragement of local initiative and experimentation, because federal 
courts may be predisposed to advancing the goals of national envi-
ronmental policy over state interests. On the other hand, federal 
courts tend to diffuse state and local impediments to environmental 
problems. For example, the siting of hazardous waste treatment 
facilities is often subject to a "not-in-my-back-yard" reaction from 
local citizens. Moreover, in the typical interstate pollution case, in 
which one state or its citizen brings a claim for property damage 
caused by interstate pollution against another state or its citizen 
who was liable for the pollution, the federal courts are the best 
positioned to hear the case.24 When there is no enforcement of na-
tional standards for air or water quality in a particular state, a 
federal court may be the appropriate forum to ensure the minimum 
enforcement necessary to fulfill the goals of Congress's legislation. 
Grassroots enforcement of national policy, through citizen propo-
sitions and citizen suits supplementing the government's implemen-
20 See Ohio v. Dep't of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 59 U.S.L.W. 
3809 (1991). 
21 Id. at 1063. 
22 For example, the federal government is suing the state of Florida for its failure to meet 
state water quality standards established pursuant to the CWA. See Laura Parker, Candor 
by Gov. Chiles Aids Everglades Cleanup; Concession Made in Federal Suit on Pollution, 
WASH. POST, May 31, 1991, at A4. 
23 See Glicksman, supra note 9, at 154. Federal law generally preempts state law when the 
state law is repugnant to the goals of the federal law. See Michael B. Guss, Comment, The 
Conflict Between Federal Bankruptcy Laws and State Environmental Regulations, 34 AM. 
U. L. REV. 1263, 1281-83 (1985). 
24 See Glicksman, supra note 9, at 153-54. 
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tation of its laws, produces yet another set of environmental cases 
for the courts. Most federal environmental laws include a special 
citizen suit provision that allows any citizen to sue the EPA to compel 
it to do its duty under the law.25 The theory behind the citizen suit 
provision is that citizen enforcers who are on the spot sometimes 
can make better decisions than distant bureaucrats about what needs 
to be done. There is also a notion that over time enforcers and 
polluters, who deal with one another constantly, may work out 
"agreements" that are not necessarily true to the spirit of the en-
vironmental law in question. The citizen outsider acts as a goad in 
such cases. 
Citizen suits have been useful tools for enforcing statutory dead-
lines for reports and regulations, requiring action on state imple-
mentation plans under the CAA, and gaining the inclusion of certain 
sources in emissions regulations. Generally, these suits seek to com-
pel the EPA administrator to perform a nondiscretionary duty under 
the particular statute. Where, however, the administrator has dis-
cretion under the law-for example, to revise standards or approve 
variances-citizen suits are not appropriate. A court may dismiss a 
citizen suit if the judge determines that compliance with the statute 
or regulation already is being "diligently pursued" in a court action. 
Under the CWA, citizens most often have used citizen suits to chal-
lenge developers acting without the appropriate permits, determine 
what projects require what permits, challenge departures from per-
mit conditions, and compel the listing of violations or the pUblication 
of guidelines within a given statutory time period. Citizen suits, 
however, do not encompass actions to make the agency take enforce-
ment action against a polluter. 
Citizen propositions and citizen suits are often effective means of 
keeping the government on its toes. They also have the potential, 
however, to jeopardize the delicate balance of enforcement and ov-
ersight that exists between the state and federal government, be-
cause they remove local enforcement from the confines of federal 
agency oversight and attempt to resolve local concerns without the 
intervention of federal agencies. 26 For example, the citizens of Cal-
ifornia voted to pass a citizen initiative called the "Safe Drinking 
Water and Toxic Enforcement Act," which imposed effluent stan-
26 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1988) (TSCA); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (1988) (CWA); 42 
U.S.C. § 7604 (1988) (CAA). FIFRA has no citizen suit provisions. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y 
(1988). 
26 See Robert F. Blomquist, Rethinking the Citizen as Prosecutor Model of Environmental 
Enforcement Under the Clean Water Act; Some Overlooked Problems of Outcome-Independent 
Values, 22 GA. L. REV. 337, 409 (1988). 
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dards that are more stringent than federal and then existing state 
standards,27 and created incentives for "citizen bounty hunters"-
citizens that report violations in order to receive a monetary reward. 
Thus, if the minimum standards that federal or state authorities 
have established are insufficient in the eyes of the public, there is 
an opportunity through the public initiative process to set stricter 
standards and compel their enforcement. Moreover, if a federal 
agency is failing to enforce minimum federal standards, an individual 
citizen may go to court to require the agency to enforce the standards 
through a citizen suit. 28 
Yet, ordinary citizens rarely if ever have the financial resources 
and know-how to undertake a major challenge to an official govern-
ment action.29 Environmental litigation is time-consuming, the stat-
utes are complex, and it often takes several years before a court 
challenge is decided. Fortunately, in addition to citizens, there are 
powerful environmental organizations that have the skill, expertise, 
and money to present environmental challenges in court. These or-
ganizations bring suits to induce agencies to undertake actions, chal-
lenge agency interpretations of law that they believe are too restric-
tive, and even intercede on the EPA or another agency's behalf if 
the agency is challenged by industry for overregulating.3o The Sierra 
Club Legal Defense Fund, National Wildlife Federation, Wilderness 
Society, Audubon Society, Environmental Defense Fund, Natural 
'Z1 See Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE §§ 25249.5, 25249.7 (Deering 1991). 
28 Actually, the number of citizen suits has been quite small under the CAA (four to five 
per year); these suits have been somewhat more numerous under the CWA (349 between 1970 
and 1986). See 1 RODGERS, supra note 14, § 3.4, at 212-13 (1986). See generally Friends of 
the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985); William S. Jordan, III, 
Citizen Litigation Under the Clean Water Act: The Second Circuit Renews Its Leadership 
Role in Environmental Law, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 829 (1986). 
29 To encourage citizen suits, Congress has included in many of the federal environmental 
statutes provisions allowing courts to order defendants, including the government, to pay 
attorney fees to successful plaintiffs. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2619(c)(2) (1988) (under TSCA, 
court may award costs and reasonable fees to prevailing party if court determines award is 
appropriate); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1988) (under CWA, court may award costs, including fees, 
to any prevailing party whenever court determines award is appropriate). 
30 The citizen suit provisions have not played anywhere near as important a role as have 
the major environmental organizations acting under regular review provisions. One commen-
tator has described citizen suits as "perpetually clinging to the perimeters of policy." 1 
RODGERS, supra note 14, § 3.4, at 213. Basically, these suits have been useful to correct only 
gross departures from the law by the EPA. Under some federal environmental statutes, 
citizens may bring suits against not only federal and state governments but also private 
polluters. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988) (CAA). Citizens undertaking such suits must give 
notice to the violator or the EPA. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988) (under CWA, 60 days 
notice). 
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Resources Defense Council (NRDC), Friends of the Earth, Earth 
Island Institute, and Greenpeace--all privately supported member-
ship organizations-are familiar figures on the environmental law 
landscape.31 Almost every important case brought to court has three 
parties: the environmental groups, the government, and the regu-
lated industry. The expertise of these environmental organizations 
assures the court that it is receiving all relevant data and arguments 
on both sides of the question. Otherwise, candidly, the court often 
would be putty in the hands of the government. 
II. WHAT KIND OF DECISIONS DOES A JUDGE MAKE AND How? 
A. Jurisdiction over Various Cases 
Our laws channel different environmental decisions to different 
courts. In general, there are three types of cases that are distributed 
among the federal courts: cases that involve nationally applicable 
law and that the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia reviews; cases that involve rules or decisions affecting only 
certain regions or localities, such as the approval of state implemen-
tation plans, and that the United States Court of Appeals in that 
region reviews;32 and cases that address violations of standards and 
failures to fulfill administrative duties and are left to the district 
courts. 
In general, only final decisions of the EPA administrator, accom-
panied by a complete record of the agency's decision, go directly to 
a federal appeals court. 33 These include such decisions as the pro-
mUlgation of air emission or water quality standards, the issuance 
of industry work practice regulations, and the granting or denying 
of permits for private and government projects. Agency inaction also 
may be final for purposes of judicial review if the inaction is tanta-
mount to a denial of relief.34 The requirement that agency actions 
31 More conservative "public interest" groups like Pacific Legal Foundation and Middle 
States Legal Foundation also have emerged, sometimes taking what might be viewed as an 
"anti-environmental" position in court. For example, they have filed suit to prevent the EPA 
from requiring Los Angeles to treat sewage before dumping it into the ocean. 
32 The regional Courts of Appeals also review challenges under 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (1988) 
regarding the control of existing sources and 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c) (1988) regarding revisions 
of emission standards, as well as noncompliance orders under 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d) (1988). 
33 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1988) (CAA). There has been much litigation over what 
constitutes a "final" order. "Jurisdictional badminton" often goes on as to whether certain 
decisions are reviewable in appellate or trial courts. Cf 7 U.S.C. § 136n(b) (1988) (under 
FIFRA, appellate review only allowed of "any order" issued "after a public hearing"). 
34 See Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
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be final before a court will review them protects the integrity of the 
administrative process and prevents the waste of judicial resources 
through the premature consideration of agency positions that may 
change. Court of Appeals review usually requires that there already 
be a developed record on the basis of which the court can evaluate 
the reasonableness of an agency's decision. 
Other kinds of environmental challenges go first to the district 
courts, where parties by right can appeal decisions to a Court of 
Appeals and from there petition the Supreme Court, which has 
discretion in taking cases. For example, civil and criminal enforce-
ment cases that an agency has brought must go first to a district 
court in order for a factual record to be made. Citizen suits, which 
seek to require the administrator to perform nondiscretionary du-
ties, also must begin in district court.35 In addition, parties challeng-
ing agency actions such as refusing to suspend hazardous waste 
permits or releasing trade secrets must make these challenges first 
in district court. 
State courts generally hear cases regarding intrastate pollution 
claims, constitutional challenges to state environmental regulations, 
challenges to state agency actions such as permitting and enforce-
ment pursuant to state regulations,36 and criminal enforcement by 
state agencies. 37 In addition, a state court may review the adequacy 
of a CAA-required state implementation plan or the failure to carry 
out that plan,38 and may hear a petition by the EPA to enforce state 
rules under that plan.39 Generally, a case involving a national issue 
of environmental law, while it may be brought in state court, will 
be removed to federal court. As a result, the state courts primarily 
are concerned with more parochial issues of environmental policy 
affecting their region. 
Thus, ours is a system of judicial diffusion, with divisions between 
upper and lower federal courts, between a federal appeals court 
centrally located in Washington, D.C. and regional federal appeals 
courts, and between federal and state courts. The division between 
the upper and lower federal courts, though it works imperfectly, has 
35 See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1988). 
36 See, e.g., Southern Cal. Edison v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 116 Cal. App. 3d 
751,753-54 (1981); Celotex Corp. v. Pollution Control Bd., 100 Ill. App. 3d 520, 520-21 (1981); 
May v. Pollution Control Bd., 35 Ill. App. 3d 930, 931~2 (1976). 
37 See Commonwealth v. Scatena, 508 Pa. 512, 515-17 (1985). 
38 See, e.g., Service Station Dealers of Greater New York, Inc. v. New York State Dep't 
of Envtl. Conservation, 535 N.Y.S.2d 503,506 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988). 
39 See, e.g., EPA v. Pollution Control Bd., 100 Ill. App. 3d 735,736 (1981). 
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a rational basis: the desire to put cases requiring the development 
of a factual record into a trial court and allow those with an already 
complete agency record to proceed directly to review by an appellate 
court.40 The division between the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals and the regional appeals courts is more an expression of 
antiWashington sentiment, at least where nationally applicable reg-
ulations are concerned. In the past, there was apprehension that a 
liberal District of Columbia Circuit would tilt too much toward the 
pro-environmental plaintiff. This decentralization has taken its toll 
in many false starts, divided opinions, and mUltiple answers to the 
same question. It also has had the effect of diluting the influence of 
Washington-based environmental litigation groupS.41 Many believe 
that, for these reasons, centralized review of air pollution regulations 
has produced more rigorous oversight than the scattered review of 
water regulations among the circuits. With regard to the federal-
state division, federal review is considered more nationally oriented 
than state court review because state courts generally are more 
concerned about the issues affecting their localities. Commentators 
have noted, however, that state courts are less deferential to state 
agencies and more protective of their states' industries and property 
interests: a stance that often results in more searching review of 
those agencies' rulemaking and enforcement actions. 42 
So far the United States has rejected the notion of a single envi-
ronmental court, basically for the reason that environmental deci-
sions are considered so value-laden that they should not be left to 
"experts." The District of Columbia Circuit, however, is preeminent 
in the environmental law field because that court hears the majority 
of the challenges to the EPA's clean air and waste disposal regula-
tions. In 1989, fourteen of ninety-seven appeals from federal district 
courts on environmental matters were in this circuit-a number 
40 The Courts of Appeals generally perform a moderating function for any extreme decisions 
of the district courts. Courts of Appeals are more distanced from the immediate localities and 
tend toward a national viewpoint. 
41 Research has suggested that some Courts of Appeals, at least during the 1970s, were 
more pro-environmental than others. During that period, the District of Columbia Circuit 
decided 16% of all environmental cases and was considered to be the most pro-environmental 
court. See LETI'IE MCSPADDEN WENNER, THE ENVIRONMENTAL DECADE IN COURT 106 
(1982). The courts in the Northeast and Midwest were distinctly more pro-environmental than 
the Western and Southern courts. See id. at 110. With the advent of a new administration 
and new judicial appointees in the 1980s, that picture may have changed. In any political 
climate, "forum shopping" goes on. See generally William E. Kovacic, The ReQ{/an Judiciary 
and Environmental Policy: The Impact of Appointment to the Federal Court of Appeals, 18 
B.C. ENVTL. AF'F. L. REV. 669 (1991). 
42 2 RODGERS, supra note 14, § 4.43, at 63~4. 
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exceeded only by the thirty-five appeals in the large Ninth Circuit. 
Of 141 appeals filed directly in all eleven Courts of Appeals, ninety-
nine went to the District of Columbia Circuit, with no more than 
nine in any other circuit.43 Thus, in some areas there is a de facto 
environmental court in the District of Columbia Circuit, and indeed, 
some believe that may be necessary for meaningful judicial over-
sight. Because federal environmental statutes are byzantine in struc-
ture and complexity, and the scientific concepts are not easy to 
absorb in one dose, a judge only feels in familiar territory after ten 
to twelve engagements. The Supreme Court takes relatively few 
environmental cases,44 so consistent oversight, if it is to be at all, 
must lie in the lower courts. The more experience a court has with 
environmental law, the easier it is to exercise that oversight. 
In my view, the threshold fighting over which court-district court 
or Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit or regional Court 
of Appeals-has jurisdiction to review a particular EPA action or 
failure to act consumes far too much litigator and court time. In a 
recent case, mercifully vacated because of new legislation, a panel 
of three judges split three ways on jurisdiction, consuming forty-six 
pages of reporter text in the process of creating no precedent. 45 
B. How Do Courts Approach Review of Different Kinds of Cases 
and Issues? 
1. Rulemaking 
Rulemaking review is the kind of case with which I am most 
familiar. Every major environmental statute expressly delegates 
authority to an agency, usually the EPA, to make rules to implement 
the statute's goals. The agency can issue such a rule only after it 
has provided public notice of its proposed rule in the Federal Reg-
ister and allowed time-usually several months-for comment by 
interested parties. After the comment period, the agency must give 
notice, again in the Federal Register, of the final rule's promulgation 
43 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE u.s. 
COURTS 105 (1989). 
44 During the 1970s, the Supreme Court decided about five environmental cases a year, 
reversing lower courts in slightly over 50% of these cases. In general, environmentalists won 
only about 30% of the time, including those cases in which they sided with the government. 
Industry did even less well, winning only 22% of their challenges. The government won in 
the largest number of cases. See WENNER, supra note 41, at 146-5l. 
45 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Administrator, EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 962-98 
(D.C. Cir. 1990), vacated, in part, and dismissed, 921 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
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with a statement of the rule's rationale and purpose. The statutes 
typically require that challenges to these rules be brought within a 
specified time-sixty days under the CAA, ninety under the CWA-
but leave room for exceptions if genuinely new information arrives 
later that justifies a challenge. The trick, of course, is to distinguish 
between "late-breaking news" and "newly-discovered strategies."46 
Most major environmental rules face a challenge at some point. 
The usual pattern is for industry to challenge some portions and the 
major environmental organizations to challenge others. Often the 
government defends one rule against assaults from both sides. 47 A 
challenge to an agency's rule typically occurs for one of four reasons: 
the rule appears to violate the statute, and the court must decide if 
the agency's interpretation of the law is wrong;48 the rule was 
adopted in violation of statutorily mandated procedural require-
ments;49 there is no substantial evidence in the record to support the 
rule;50 or, if there is substantial evidence, either the agency's rea-
soning based on that evidence is so defective as to be arbitrary, or 
the agency did not adequately defend challenges that interested 
parties raised against its reasoning during the comment period. 51 
Federal courts tend to defer to an agency's authority and expertise 
if these manifest themselves in the agency's rationale. 52 Courts also 
give credence to the consistency of the agency's position, the thor-
oughness of the process through which the agency reached its final 
decision, and the presence or lack of any action by Congress to 
compel the agency to alter its position. An agency rule is more likely 
to get in trouble with a reviewing court when there is a dispute 
regarding whether the statute in question allows the agency to do 
46 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b)(1) (1988). Similarly, the CAA provides that a challenge not 
brought within the specified time may be precluded as a defense to enforcement proceedings. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B} (1988). Many of the valid excuses for late challenges are based 
on newly discovered information gotten by way of FOIA requests. 
47 See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1146, 1152, 1160 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990) (EPA regulations under RCRA challenged by industry as too strict and by Natural 
Resources Defense Council as too lenient). 
48 See id. (finding agency's interpretation of statute unreasonable). For examples of cases 
in which the court found the agency's interpretation of a statute reasonable, see National 
Wildlife Fed'n v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 453, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Chemical Mfr.'s Ass'n v. EPA, 
919 F.2d 158, 170 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
49 See, e.g., Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 546-50 
(D.C. Cir. 1983). 
50 See, e.g., id. 
51 See, e.g., National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1146, 1165 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990). 
62 See, e.g., National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 170 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
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what it seeks to do,53 when the agency's logic seems to ignore any 
relevant concerns,54 or when the court simply cannot make heads or 
tails of the agency's reasoning. 55 When such a dispute occurs, courts 
do not always invalidate the rule, but often merely send it back for 
reconsideration or a better explanation. Reviewing courts use this 
remand technique when it is necessary either to understand what 
the agency did or to ensure the integrity of decisionmaking below. 
Although most rules are challenged, the courts rarely strike rules 
down. Between 1970 and 1986, the Supreme Court heard only eleven 
air pollution cases and decided for the government in all but two. 56 
In nineteen water pollution cases that the Court decided in the same 
period, the government won on twenty issues and lost on five, in-
dustry had fifteen wins and nine losses, and environmentalists won 
only six out of fifteen. 57 As between the various environmental laws, 
the survival rates of rules on review differ. For example, the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) fares worse 
than the CAA.58 This could be a function of the lack of centralized 
review for FIFRA rules or of the courts' less deferential attitude 
toward the EPA's expertise in an area that traditionally has been 
the province of the Department of Agriculture. 
When a court does strike down an agency rule, it is often because 
the notice of rulemaking failed to tell its readers enough about what 
the agency was proposing, so that they could comment intelligently. 
Other reasons include an agency's unreasonable explanations for 
what it did, its reliance on undecipherable data, its use of inconsis-
tent rationales, its failure to analyze or explore the costs and benefits 
of an option, its nondisclosure of data, and its failure to come to 
grips with important contradictory evidence. These reasons all add 
up to an agency responsibility to convince an educated generalist 
judge that the agency's rule is the product of intelligent policymak-
ing, not sloppy work or pure political ideology. 59 
Now, it might sound as though judges have overwhelming power 
over environmental administrators, but in reality this is not so. The 
63 See, e.g., Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058, 1060 (6th Cir. 1990), 
em. granted, 111 S. Ct. 2256 (1991). 
54 See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1146, 1165 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990). 
56 See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (en banc). 
56 See 1 RODGERS, supra note 14, § 3.5, at 228-29. 
67 See 2 id. § 4.6, at 87-89. 
68 See 3 id. § 5.4, at 59. 
69 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57-58 
(1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissent~ng). 
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Supreme Court has been quite deferential to agency rulemaking 
power. It has held that a court cannot impose any procedural re-
quirement on the rulemaking process that Congress itself has not 
imposed. 60 Moreover, according to the Court, unless it is crystal 
clear that Congress intended a certain interpretation of a statute, 
courts must defer to any reasonable interpretation of the law that 
an agency puts forth. 61 In addition, in the areas of agency utilization 
of resources and establishment of enforcement priorities, the Court 
has told lower courts to leave an agency alone unless it has violated 
a specific statutory mandate. 62 
Still, even within such strictures, overrulings of agency rules oc-
casionally do occur. Perhaps the most frequent ground for sending 
a rule back to an agency is that the rule does not reflect "reasoned 
decisionmaking," that is, the agency's explanation for what it did 
does not pass muster with the court. Either the agency failed to 
justify its assumptions in the public record, it failed to take account 
of important considerations, it did not answer critical comments by 
participants in the rulemaking, or it has relied on logic that makes 
no sense. What courts look for in reasoned decisionmaking is that 
an agency has spelled out the problem, plotted its options, calculated 
60 See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(D) (1988) (under CAA, any procedural error must be so serious 
or of such central relevance that rule likely would have been changed if error had not been 
made to warrant reversal); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524-25 (1978). 
61 See Chevron United States Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842-43 (1984). This was not always so. In the early days of environmental law, courts 
were more active in promoting environmentalist values. They subjected agencies to procedural 
requirements that the laws did not explicitly set out. See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. 
EPA, 612 F.2d 1232, 1236 (10th Cir. 1979) (court required statement of basis and purpose 
more detailed than APA required). Courts interpreted environmental laws expansively. See, 
e.g., Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 391-92 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (court 
required emission reductions to level achievable only through technology not yet in use), cen. 
denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974). Overall, they engaged in rigorous "hard looks" at agencies' 
reasons for deciding as they did. The courts also interpreted statutory terms for themselves, 
giving an agency only the deference they thought it deserved. 
Judges often expressed a special concern for the environment. According to one court, 
"[a]gency decisions in the environmental area touch on fundamental personal interests in life 
and health, and these interests have always had a special claim to judicial protection." Sci-
entists' Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 
1973); see also Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 
1971). 
Some commentators are critical of the new judicial nonactivism. See, e.g., Robert L. Glicks-
man,A Retreat from Judicial Activism: The Seventh Circuit and the Environment, 63 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 209, 210 (1987). "A judiciary unwilling to review in any meaningful way the 
faithfulness of agency decisions to statutory goals invites executive branch subversion of the 
legislature's will. A judiciary that refuses to carry out the responsibilities delegated to it in 
regulatory legislation itself infringes upon congressional authority." Id. 
62 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 834 (1985). 
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the consequences of the major options, provided support in the 
record for the option it chose, and addressed the major objections 
to that choice. In the end, it comes down to what one commentator 
has called "good thought processes and intuitively convincing out-
comes."63 
Many courts, particularly the District of Columbia Circuit, still 
employ the "hard look" review-they vigorously scrutinize an agen-
cy's rationale for a rule to make sure the agency has reached a 
conclusion based on facts in the public record, not on secret or hidden 
reasons. Thus, judicial review "on the record" prevents agency of-
ficials from considering the secret ex parte contributions of lobbyists, 
superior officials, or members of Congress. 64 
Hard look review also means close inquiry into the completeness 
and soundness of an agency's analysis and reasoning-analysis and 
reasoning that must be on the record. Congress adopted the hard 
look doctrine as the appropriate standard for review in the CAA, 
which expressly requires that the EPA disclose all of the data sup-
porting a proposed rule, rebut all serious objections to the rule, and 
publicly explain its rationale. 65 On the other hand, courts are gen-
erally more deferential to agencies regarding the methodologies the 
agencies use to analyze data and the policy choices they make. In 
sum, the standard for review that will ensure reasoned decision-
making "is not whether the agency analysis is impeccable, but 
whether it is reasonable; not whether most of the evidence supports 
the agency's position but whether enough of it does; [and] not 
whether the agency's policy choices are wise but whether they are 
rational. "66 
There is an interesting synergistic relationship between agencies 
and courts in our system. Courts often lecture agencies in their 
opinions, chastising and warning them about agency policies or rea-
soning without actually overruling the challenged rules. Noone has 
ever measured the effects of such lectures. We do know, however, 
that agencies often draft their rules and rationales with judicial 
review in mind-some say too much so. The prospect of judicial 
review may be a healthy deterrent to agency politicalization or bu-
reaucratic insensitivity. 
63 2 RODGERS, supra note 14, § 4.3, at 35. 
64 See Sierra Club v. Costie, 657 F.2d 298, 322-25, 400-02 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
65 See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (1988). 
66 See Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 541 (D.C. Cir. 
1983). 
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There is, however, some sentiment in the United States that the 
specter of judicial review inhibits and impedes rulemakers. Some 
say that the courts, despite Supreme Court admonitions, dig too 
deeply into the record, looking for minute mistakes, or worse still, 
that they substitute their own policy preferences for an agency's 
under the guise of detecting flaws in the agency's reasoned decision-
making. Critics on the other side complain equally vociferously that, 
in most instances, the courts bow cursorily toward agencies and give 
them no real testing at all. Still others complain that it is the luck 
of the draw-which judges sit on review-as to whether an agency 
decision will receive a hard look or a soft glance. 
From my own experience, judging is an art, not a science. Judges 
are rarely totally naive about the political aspects of major environ-
mental decisions-they read the papers, listen to the radio, and 
watch television. They are also cognizant of their generalist back-
ground and education and their limited expertise in specific areas. 
If an agency sets out the evidence in favor of its rule and explains 
cogently why it rejected competing evidence or drew the inferences 
it did from that evidence, and if the evidence is not intuitively 
unconvincing or incomplete, few judges will overrule the agency's 
rule. The evidence upon which the agency relies, however, must be 
in the public record and not accessible to the agency alone. 
Most judges also realize that no one environmental issue can be 
decided in a vacuum. The law of the environment, like the environ-
ment itself, is a seamless web: "[p]luck at anyone point in the 
intricate fabric of our ecosystem and the web of relationships changes 
shape, disrupting the previous equilibrium so that further changes 
must be made to offset both intended and unintended effects. "67 
One particularly difficult area for courts to review is risk assess-
ment. Neither agencies, scientists, nor courts yet know the ultimate 
effects on the global environment of acid precipitation, thermal pol-
lution, or hazardous waste disposal; nor do they know on whom any 
discernible risks will fall. Yet, both agencies and courts must make 
decisions regarding these risks in the face of uncertainty. 
In the Toxics Substance Control Act (TSCA), for instance, Con-
gress used the phrase "unreasonable risk" thirty-eight times as a 
standard for regulating toxics. Where the statute does not define or 
modify the word "risk," the courts themselves have introduced the 
67 THOMAS M. HOBAN & RICHARD O. BROOKS, GREEN JUSTICE: THE ENVIRONMENT AND 
THE COURTS 6 (1987). 
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adjective "unreasonable" to fashion a standard.68 If there is an "un-
reasonable" social, economic, or physical risk, then the EPA must 
engage wholesale in assessments of those risks, and the courts must 
review those assessments. "Unreasonable" necessarily means that 
the agency's choices will be intensely value-laden. 
At the end of the process of identifying hazards and assessing dose 
responses and exposure levels, the EPA must describe the nature 
and magnitude of the human risk that a particular toxic substance 
poses, including attendant uncertainties, in a way that judges can 
follow. The agency need not show the risk with certainty, given the 
inevitable uncertainties stemming from the flawed state of knowl-
edge about the long-term and chronic effects of many toxic sub-
stances.69 The "proof" of a risk often will be a mix of scientific 
theories, modeling exercises, trend projections, and facts extrapo-
lated from one body of data to another. Moreover, uncertainty about 
the threshold levels of exposure to a substance that causes harm is 
unavoidable. Nonetheless, one can expect judges to be deeply inter-
ested in the risk assessment process and to insist that they be able 
to understand it. In the final analysis, courts can look only for a 
reasonable basis for concluding that a substance significantly con-
tributes to an unreasonable risk to health and the environment. 
It is interesting to note that the delays and frustrations of rule-
making review have given rise to a movement of some momentum 
called "negotiated rulemaking" or "reg-neg."70 In "reg-neg," the in-
terested players sit down and negotiate a rule with the agency, then 
sign a stipulation of their agreement. This process, which Congress 
specifically authorized and encouraged in the Negotiated Rulemaking 
Act of 1990,71 largely circumvents any court challenge to a negotiated 
rule. Use of the technique has resulted in some spectacular successes 
under the CAA with regard to alternative fuels in dirty cities and 
the quality of air in the Grand Canyon region. Though practically 
limited to disputes where the affected interests are limited in number 
68 See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 639--52 (1980) (to 
issue health and safety standard under Occupational Safety and Health Act, Secretary of 
Labor first must determine "that it is reasonably necessary and appropriate to remedy a 
significant risk ... "). 
69 See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 24-25 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 
941 (1976). 
70 See Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 
Stat.) 469; see also Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. 
L.J. 1, 28--S1 (1982). 
71 See Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 
Stat.) 469. 
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and their differences not irreconcilable, parties have used the pro-
cedure effectively over twenty times. Whether or not "reg-neg" will 
enjoy any advantage in judicial review sought by nonconsenting 
parties has yet to be seen. 
2. Failure to Engage in Rulemaking 
The EPA's rulemaking responsibilities under current federal en-
vironmental laws are gargantuan. For example, one commentator 
has described TSCA in the following way: 
[t]he statute is perceived simultaneously as vast and puny; it is 
all-encompassing from one view, a mere "gap-filler" from an-
other. Comparisons of regulatory potential with actual output 
underscore these sharp contrasts. TSCA is often mentioned in 
close proximity to the universe of known chemicals (5 million), 
the numbers of new compounds produced annually (250,000), 
those finding their way each year into the commercial market 
place (1,000), numbers of chemicals to which Americans are ex-
posed (60,000 to 70,000), percentage of these inadequately tested 
for health and environmental effects (84%), and estimates of 
human cancers attributable to environmental contaminants (60 
to 90 percent). Those thinking big are inclined to associate TSCA 
with huge benefits, crushing costs ($8.2 billion by the decade 
ending in 1988), and sweeping new rules (visiting the prospects 
of "sudden, complete regulation" on the entire chemical indus-
try). 72 
Legislators are prone to both broadly worded mandates and sta-
tutory goals and unreasonable deadlines for achieving them. When 
appropriation time comes around, however, they are not so willing 
to provide agencies with the personnel and funding to complete their 
assigned tasks. As a result, agencies are forced to prioritize. When 
an agency is perceived to lose direction, will, and even integrity, 
however, Congress will move in to tell it what to do. For example, 
the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA) to RCRA, 
addressing RCRA's "cradle-to-grave" scheme for waste disposal, had 
seventy-nine deadlines for agency action. 73 Some of this legislative 
micromanaging was an understandable reaction to periods of insuf-
ferable miasma and even corruption at the EPA in the mid-1980s. 
Under the HSWA, unless the EPA took action through rulemaking 
within a certain time, the hammer of statutory prescriptions was to 
fill the administrative void. 
72 3 RODGERS, supra note 14, § 6.1, at 373-74 (citations omitted). 
73 Id. § 7.1, at 512. 
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Despite Congress's use of this "hammer" technique, parties often 
have called upon courts to enforce statutory deadlines, for the pro-
mulgation of rules, that the EPA says it cannot meet. In the face of 
such impasses, courts sometimes have extended the time for rule-
making for a specified period; more often they have become media-
tors, using the prestige of the court to force the parties to agree to 
a new timetable that both parties find tolerable. Almost always 
courts are faced with the agency defense that mandating the rule-
making at issue will mean costly delay in the agency's addressing 
some even more important priority. Unfortunately, agencies rarely 
have, or at least rarely provide the court with, a concrete table of 
priorities to back up their claims. 74 
Where a statute does not include any deadlines, courts still enter-
tain appeals from environmentalists challenging the EPA's refusal 
to initiate rulemaking on request. In these instances, courts show 
the greatest deference to agencies; a challenger must prove over-
whelmingly that the agency, by not engaging in rulemaking on a 
particular subject, is circumventing the statute in question. In some 
cases, Congress has lifted that burden. For example, section 21 of 
TSCA specifically provides for petitions to the EPA for the issuance 
of rules and a de novo trial in court if the agency declines. 75 
3. NEPA Review 
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), passed in 1970, 
provides that "in all major federal actions significantly affecting the 
quality of human environment," federal agencies must prepare en-
vironmental impact statements (EISs) that analyze the environmen-
tal costs and benefits of the intended action and all reasonable alter-
natives. 76 Although an agency's decisionmakers must consider the 
contents of the EIS for the agency's proposed action, NEPA does 
not compel them to come to anyone conclusion. 
The courts have played a significant role in deciding which actions 
require an EIS and whether an EIS for a particular project is 
adequate. In one of the first NEPA cases to come to court, Calvert 
Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. United States Atomic En-
ergy Commission,77 Judge Skelly Wright of the District of Columbia 
74 EPA, however, recently has engaged in a "worst risk" assessment that lists its priorities 
for regulation. 
75 See 15 U.S.C. § 2620 (1988). 
76 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988). 
77 449 F.2d 1109, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
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Circuit insisted that an EIS be a complete and thoughtful document, 
and that it expressly be made a part of the decisionmaking process. 
The Calvert Cliffs' case illustrates how "a court can construe a 
tightly worded statute so loosely that it can . . . be safely ignored 
by an understaffed and underfunded agency," or make a general 
direction "into a stringent mandate. "78 In writing NEP A, Congress 
did not describe the precise contents of an EIS or specify the weight 
that an agency was to give to an EIS that it had prepared. The court 
in Calvert Cliffs' filled those gaps. 
Although NEP A does not require that an agency base its proposed 
action on its EIS, in fact several of the EISs that courts have found 
insufficient or incomplete have resulted in the agency taking a second 
look and either modifying or abandoning the project. In the first 
decade after its passage, NEPA generated more cases than any other 
statute: almost 900 in all, most involving proposed highways or dams, 
oversight of oil drilling, or Forest Service sale of timber lands. In 
most cases, courts were sympathetic to environmentalists. when 
there was a question as to whether a particular project required an 
EIS, but less sympathetic when the case turned on whether a com-
pleted EIS was satisfactory. By the end of the statute's first decade, 
NEP A litigation had declined, presumably because environmental 
activists had realized that it could not compel any outcome, and 
because agencies had learned how to write EISs that courts would 
accept. 
When a court reviews an EIS for adequacy, it does not substitute 
its own policy judgment for that of the agency. Its only task is to 
"ensure that the statement contains sufficient discussion of the rel-
evant issues and opposing viewpoints to enable the decisionmaker 
to take a 'hard look' at environmental factors and to make a reasoned 
decision. "79 As a result, it may be difficult to challenge an agency 
action on the grounds that its EIS is inadequate. For example, an 
environmental group recently challenged an EIS, arguing that the 
agency discussed only a "no project" alternative in the EIS, rather 
than any other feasible sites. 80 Although the EIS merely stated that 
the agency had eliminated all alternative sites. from consideration 
for nonenvironmental reasons and did not compare the environmen-
tal impacts of these possible alternatives, the District of Columbia 
78 HOBAN & BROOKS, supra note 67, at 60. 
79 See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 865 F.2d 288, 294 (D.C. Cir. 
1988). 
80 See Tongass Conservation Soc'y v. Cheney, 924 F.2d 1137, 1138-39 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
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Circuit upheld the EIS as adequate. It appears then that an agency 
need provide only the barest explanation in an EIS for its decision. 
4. Settlements 
In the ongoing relationship between the major environmental 
groups and the EPA, litigation is just one aspect of a complex 
bargaining process that encompasses agency processes, legislative 
advocacy, and court challenges. Often, once a suit is filed or discovery 
completed, settlement negotiations begin in earnest. Sometimes, 
new legislation makes the prospect of litigation less attractive for 
one of the parties. Almost always, because environmental litigation 
is so costly and time-consuming, and because it is conducted pri-
marily by institutional players who deal with each other continually, 
both sides are anxious to settle. The court-approved consent decrees 
that result often redefine the responsibilities of the agency just as 
surely as a formal opinion, and settlements of large environmental 
disputes, especially class actions, can have enormous implications 
not just for the parties but also for the law. 
For example, Judge Weinstein of New York, an innovative federal 
district court judge, effected a settlement of a huge and legally 
complex class action involving the individual and group claims of 
both Vietnam veterans exposed to the herbicide Agent Orange and 
their families. He took over a slow-moving suit against several pes-
ticide manufacturers and promptly set a trial date for six months 
later, insisted that the federal government be joined with the man-
ufacturers in the case, and revealed tentative rulings on key legal 
issues to both sides. Judge Weinstein also hired a consultant to 
develop a strategy for creating an aggregate fund from which claims 
would be paid, allocating contributions to that fund among different 
manufacturers, and setting forth criteria for distribution to claim-
ants. Finally, he appointed three settlement masters and personally 
participated in around-the-clock negotiations inside the courthouse. 
Judge Weinstein's distinctive role in the Agent Orange settlement 
negotiations is thought to have been the key to their success. He 
did not hesitate to use his authority to display his knowledge of the 
key factors relevant to settlement or announce his commitment to 
settlement as the best way to resolve the case. The settlement 
resulted in the establishment of a $180-million fund to pay claimants 
exposed to Agent Orange without ever requiring a ruling that Agent 
Orange caused their injuries. One commentator has said that "Agent 
Orange exemplifies a class of cases, likely to grow in the future, 
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whose complexity, costliness and controversial nature generate 
strong incentive for settlement among parties, lawyers, and 
judges. "81 
Another example of a judge playing a proactive role in the settle-
ment process was Judge H. Russel Holland's response to the initial 
Exxon Valdez settlement proposal, which would have allowed Exxon 
to pay $1 billion to resolve its civil liability to the state and federal 
governments over the next fourteen years. Exxon also would have 
agreed to plead guilty to four criminal violations and pay a fine of 
$100 million in settlement of its criminal liability. That settlement 
would have been the largest settlement ever for damage resulting 
from an environmental disaster. Judge Holland rejected the $100-
million criminal fine, saying that the environmental damage resulting 
from the 1989 oil spill was "off the charts compared to other envi-
ronmental disasters in this country," and that "the fines that were 
proposed were simply not adequate. They do not adequately achieve 
deterrence."82 After Judge Holland rejected the criminal part of the 
settlement package, the civil settlement for the remaining $1 billion 
fell through. 
Another unusual aspect of the proposed Exxon Valdez settlement 
was its provision allowing members of the public to express their 
views by mail directly to Judge Holland as he decided whether to 
approve the plea agreement on the criminal charges. Judge Holland 
noted that the letters he received criticized the criminal penalty as 
too small. 83 Although settlement may have prevented a costly trial, 
thereby saving the government and Exxon litigation expenses, 
Judge Holland believed the settlement was not a fair one, and there-
fore refused to give his approval. He later accepted another settle-
ment proposal. 
A judge, in approving a consent decree that settles a case, must 
ensure that the decree is fair to all of the major interests, or at least 
that it does not preclude the right of these interests to sue sepa-
rately.84 The judge usually schedules a hearing on the proposed 
settlement for all interested parties to voice their objections. This 
81 See Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases, 53 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 337, 340 (1986). 
82 Exxon Withdraws Guilty Plea in Alaskan Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1991, § 1, at 
8. 
83 Keith Schneider, Judge Rejects $100 Million Fine for Exxon in Oil Spill as Too Low, 
N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1991, § A, at 1. 
84 See Patricia M. Wald, Negotiation of Environmental Disputes: A New Role for Courts?, 
10 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 25-26 (1985). 
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can be an extremely important stage for the main challenger, who 
may be settling for reasons that are not in the interests of others. 
Environmental advocates usually represent largely anonymous 
classes of litigants and on occasion may be tempted to elevate their 
own institutional agendas over those of their unknown clients. 
Settlements substantially can restrict the EPA as it makes deci-
sions about establishing priorities and utilizing resources. One set-
tlement between the EPA and the NRDC effected structural 
changes in the agency's pesticide registration processes, revised its 
procedures for developing standards, and provided for the reassess-
ment of earlier decisions on thirteen chemicals. 85 Such detailed and 
complex settlements leave the EPA with little discretion. Indeed, 
the government unsuccessfully attempted to extricate itself from 
one such consent decree by arguing that a new Administration should 
not have its hands tied by decrees that its predecessor had negoti-
ated. 86 
The judge's role in supervising settlements is vitally important in 
the environmental area, because the EPA's and the environmental 
groups' resources are so limited that they can make a dent in their 
agendas only by settling large numbers of cases. As a result, many 
cases avoid a judge's hand at the trial and appellate level, but are 
still subject to a judge's approval at the settlement stage. Because 
a judge often will hold the fate of many unrepresented but injured 
parties in her hand when a consent decree comes before her for 
approval, the judge's role in environmental law through settlement 
is a significant one indeed. 
5. Remedies 
The judge also figures prominently in the creation of remedies for 
the violation of environmental laws. Most environmental statutes 
provide for both civil and criminal liability.87 Creating remedies is 
primarily a task for district court judges once they have found in-
dividual violations by polluters, whether private or public. Some of 
85 See 14 [Recent Developments] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,468, 10,473 (Dec. 1984) 
(Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 2-3, Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, No. 83-1509 (D.D.C. Sept. 19, 1984) (resulting in settlement agreement». 
See generally 3 RODGERS, supra note 14, § 5.9, at 117-19. 
86 See Citizens for a Better Env't v. EPA, 718 F.2d 1117, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cen. 
denied, 467 U.S. 1219 (1984). 
87 For a thorough discussion of criminal liability in environmental law, see Symposium: 
Environmental Crime, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 775, 775-999 (1991) (entire volume dedicated 
to criminal enforcement of environmental laws). 
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the remedies ordered over the years have been extremely contro-
versial. 
Back in the early 1970s, for example, a trial judge enjoined the 
Reserve Mining Company from dumping its taconite tailings into 
Lake Superior. 88 On the basis of speculative but as yet unproven 
health risks, the regional Court of Appeals modified the injunction 
and gave the company time to find a land-based disposal site before 
enjoining any more dumping into the water.89 The company's primary 
argument was that it would have to shut down its plant if the 
injunction went into effect, thereby causing the community to lose 
thousands of jobs. 
In a more recent example, a court-ordered remedy required the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, which had violated the CWA, to 
give its Water Resources Authority the power to acquire a suitable 
landfill site, and forbade the state to hook up any new sewer lines 
emptying into Boston Harbor until it did SO.90 Similarly, in California, 
the city of Los Angeles had been dumping sludge from its sewage 
treatment plant into the Santa Monica Bay. The federal government, 
citing obvious environmental concerns, sued the city; the court 
forced the city to halt its dumping practice in late 1987,91 and as-
sessed $4 million in fines against the county of Los Angeles. 92 Al-
though the city of Los Angeles since has reduced its waste water 
pollution to historically low levels, the county still has been unable 
to treat its sludge to remove the required ninety percent of contam-
inants and has tried to obtain a waiver from the requirements under 
the CWA.93 
88 United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11,86 (D. Minn. 1974), modified, in 
part, sub nom. Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 540 (8th Cir. 1975). 
89 Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 537 (8th Cir.) (en banc), modified, en bane, 
7 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1782, 1783 (8th Cir. 1975). 
90 See United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 930 F.2d 132, 137 (1st Cir. 1991). The 
federal task of policing state and local governments, in the words of an EPA official, may tend 
to breed a "nonenforcement culture" at the agency. A recent Washington Post expose on the 
enforcement of safe drinking water laws reported that, between 1988 and 1990, the EPA 
imposed only 41 fines, recommended civil litigation in only 36 cases, and issued 507 stop orders 
and 1714 other enforcement orders-in the wake of an estimated 60,000 present violations. 
Thus, any kind of enforcement occurred in only 8.3% of known or suspected violations. 
Moreover, it was primarily the states that undertook these enforcement measures. See Michael 
Weisskopf, EPA Falls Far Short in Enforcing Drinking Water Laws, WASH. POST, May 20, 
1991, at Ai. 
91 See John Chandler, L.A. Seeking Approval to Truck Sludge to High Desert, L.A. TIMES,' 
Mar. 13, 1990, at B3. 
92 See Tom Hayden, County Drags Its Feet and the Bay Still Suffers, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 
11, 1988, § 5, at 5. 
93 See id. 
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The well-known Love Canal case is a classic example of a court-
ordered remedy to an environmental problem. The Love Canal was 
a six-block-Iong pit left over from an abandoned canal in what had 
been designed as a model city near Niagara Falls, New York. The 
abandoned canal became a landfill for about 22,000 tons of hazardous 
wastes which a chemical company buried there between 1947 and 
1953. In 1953, the company capped the landfill and sold the property 
to the city of Niagara Falls, and homes and a school were built 
around the edge of the old canal bed. After it became evident that 
the site could pose a serious danger, the state declared a health 
emergency and evacuated residents from the area. Finally, in Feb-
ruary 1988, federal District Court Judge John Curtin found Occiden-
tal Chemical Corporation, the successor to the chemical company 
that had created the landfill, liable arid ordered it to pay the cost of 
the cleanup, then estimated at $250 million. 94 
More recently, a federal judge in Washington suspended all future 
timber sales there because timber companies were clear-cutting old-
growth trees, which are the habitat of the northern spotted owl, an 
endangered species. The decision, it is reported, may cost tens of 
thousands of jobs. The judge in question answered that "[t]he ar-
gument that the mightiest economy on Earth cannot afford to pre-
serve old-growth forests for a short time, while it reaches an overdue 
decision on how to manage them, is not convincing today. "95 The 
judge gave the Forest Service nine months to draft a protection plan 
for the owl. In the meantime timber sales have been suspended. 
In many cases, then, it seems to take a life-tenured judge to 
enforce the law as written. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Environmental law in the United States is a product of the inter-
action among the three branches of the federal government and 
between the federal government and the individual states. The ju-
diciary's unique role in ensuring that states and federal agencies 
carry out the will of Congress derives in large part from our theory 
of the separation of powers. In a parliamentary system of govern-
ment, in which the executive is more immediately responsible to the 
94 See Dennis Hevesi, The Long History of a Toxic-Waste Nightmare, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
28, 1988, at B4. 
95 John Lancaster, Environmentalists Hail Freeze on Timber Sales to Guard Owl; Industry 
Group Warns of Escalating Timber Prices, WASH. POST, May 25, 1991, § 1, at A2. 
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legislature, the judicial mission in implementing legislative intent 
might be a less urgent one. 
In the early days of our environmental law, judges played an 
activist role, establishing procedures for agencies to follow and me-
ticulously examining their reasons for taking actions. The Supreme 
Court has put a damper on such activist review, and courts are now 
more deferential to agencies, although they generally still insist that 
agencies follow the statutes and make their rationales intelligent and 
complete. Today, the impossibility of legislating minutely in the 
environmental area, combined with the tremendous discretion ac-
corded the agencies implementing the laws, makes the court's role 
even more important. The court must be a neutral, impartial arbiter, 
ensuring the execution and uniform application of the laws as written 
and providing for citizen redress against autocratic or arbitrary 
actions by the bureaucracy. 
Some of the power of the courts in the environmental area arises 
from our system of stare decisis or precedent, that is, what one court 
decides in one case binds future courts in similar cases. This ability 
to set precedent increases the clout of the courts, so that agencies 
must follow their directions. The courts' preoccupation with fairness 
and process acts as a restraint on agency preoccupation with science 
and technical concerns. The need for agency specialists to convince 
generalist judges of the rightness of what they are doing requires 
the agencies to think about the results of their actions in more 
general, human terms. Finally, judicial opinions often best reflect 
society's environmental goals and the tradeoffs involved in reaching 
them: the everpresent struggle of increased development, housing 
needs, and heightened production against the preservation of natural 
resources and the protection of air and water quality, endangered 
species, and wetlands. 
Although some worry that nonspecialist judges cannot understand 
the arcane subject matter of environmental law, for the most part 
judges have proven themselves capable of mastering its essentials 
in the same degree as elected legislators and agency policymakers. 
In cases brought to compel the federal or state government to act, 
trial courts on occasion have exercised dramatic powers, stopping 
timber sales, immediately enjoining all disposal of wastes, or barring 
the addition of new sewer hookups. Such rulings have a significant 
effect on agency decisionmaking, but in the absence of such judicial 
exercises of power, it is difficult to see how agencies can be con-
trolled. Legislative oversight is too sporadic for such a task. For-
tunately, judicial oversight is possible because of the major environ-
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mental organizations that can go face to face with the government 
in court. Ordinary citizens rarely have the resources to conduct such 
litigation because of the excessive time and money that trials and 
appeals consume. 
In the end, the court's role in environmental law assists the leg-
islators and agency decisionmakers in answering four basic ques-
tions. How and when do we compensate those who suffer loss from 
environmental change, and how do we extract payment from those 
who gain by it? How do we control the technologies that promise so 
much, and ensure that they do not simply leave us with damage and 
uncertainty? And, how do we adapt our traditional legal concepts to 
a world of increasing scientific complexity?96 Those decisions require 
the application of equity as well as expertise and, in the United 
States at least, benefit from judicial input. 
96 See HOBAN & BROOKS, supra note 67, at 10. 
